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Essentialism is an ontological belief that there exists an underlying essence 
to a category. This article advances and tests in three studies the hypothesis 
that communication about a social category, and expected or actual mu-
tual validation, promotes essentialism about a social category. In study 1, 
people who wrote communications about a social category to their ingroup 
audiences essentialized it more strongly than those who simply memorized 
about it. In study 2, communicators whose messages about a novel social 
category were more elaborately discussed with a confederate showed a 
stronger tendency to essentialize it. In study 3, communicators who elabo-
rately talked about a social category with a naive conversant also essential-
ized the social category. A meta-analysis of the results supported the hy-
pothesis that communication promotes essentialism. Although essentialism 
has been discussed primarily in perceptual and cognitive domains, the role 
of social processes as its antecedent deserves greater attention.
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Social scientists have taken for granted the observation that humans construct 
social reality through symbolically mediated social interaction. Large scale social 
institutions such as nation states, financial systems, and even universities are un-
doubtedly human constructions that define social realities, which in turn shape 
human social action (e.g., Durkheim, 1982; Giddens, 1993). Social interactions in 
small groups, too, generate social reality that is largely emergent in the particular 
situation (e.g., Asch, 1952; Festinger, 1950; Sherif, 1936). However, until a recent 
return of interest in the social basis of cognition, this critical observation had lain 
dormant in the background of social psychological theorizing, despite some nota-
ble exceptions (e.g., Moscovici, 1976; Rommetveit, 1974). While philosophers (e.g., 
Searle, 1995) are debating the ontological structure of social reality, there is a criti-
cal question of how we come to have a psychological sense of social reality, which 
Higgins and his colleagues called shared reality (e.g., Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Hig-
gins, 1992), and what may be its social psychological consequences.
All the more significant for social psychology is the shared reality of a social 
category, or a large aggregate of individuals such as gender-, ethnicity-, and na-
tionality-based groups. A social category is a distinct type of social group (Lickel 
et al., 2000); however, not all social categories are equally psychologically real. As 
Allport (1954) noted, some social categories have “primary potency” and “act like 
shrieking sirens, deafening us to all finer discriminations that we might otherwise 
perceive” (p. 179). These are psychologically real social categories. With Rothbart 
and Taylor (1992), we suggest that psychologically real social categories may be 
essentialized, that is, seen to possess an immutable underlying essence. In this article, 
we consider interpersonal communication as a source of the psychological sense 
of social reality. As Hardin and Higgins (1996) put it,
in the absence of social verification, experience is transitory, random, and ephem-
eral . . . But once recognized by others and shared in an on-going, dynamic process 
of social verification . . . experience is no longer subjective; instead, it achieves the 
phenomenological status of objective reality. That is, experience is established as 
valid and reliable to the extent that it is shared with others” (p. 28).
In particular, as Kashima (2004) suggested, under some circumstances, a commu-
nicator’s act of speaking about a social category and establishing a mutual under-
standing about it with an audience--the process that Clark (1996; see Kashima, 
Klein, & Clark, 2007) called grounding--may be sufficient for the communicator to 
establish what Higgins and his colleagues called a shared reality, and to essential-
ize the social category. We explicate this hypothesis below, and three studies are 
reported in its support.
CoMMunICATIon And EssEnTIALIsM
What would happen when people learn about a novel social category? One of 
the consequences, largely neglected in social psychology, is for them to talk about 
it. Let us call the person who has the information about the category, sender, and 
the other who is ignorant of it and receives the sender’s communication, receiver. 
Under this circumstance, how would their conversation proceed? Clark’s (1996) 
grounding model gives a clear guidance. The sender begins a phase of communi-
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cation by presenting an utterance that contains some propositional representations 
about the social category: Group X is like P, where P stands for some properties 
of the group. In order to complete the communication, the receiver is obliged to 
indicate his or her understanding of the utterance (i.e., acceptance) by providing 
the sender with verbal or nonverbal evidence that he or she has understood it ap-
propriately. Evidence could take various forms (e.g., Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson, 
2000; Clark, 1996), from a simple acknowledgment such as “OK” or “Oh, yeah,” to 
a more elaborate paraphrasing or probing questions, such as “So, group X is like 
P, and they do things like p1, p2, and p3, huh?” When the sender gains sufficient 
confidence that the receiver has understood his or her impression about the social 
category, or the group impression is grounded between the communicators well 
enough, this phase of the communication ends. 
The grounding of the sender’s impression by the receiver may establish shared 
reality in the sense Hardin and Higgins (1996) described it. Because the sender 
is the only person who has the information, the receiver is unlikely or unable to 
disagree with the sender’s impression. In the absence of a disagreement, the re-
ceiver’s understanding of the sender’s impression may be seen by the sender as 
evidence that the receiver has also agreed with the sender’s impression. Note that 
Echterhoff, Higgins, and Groll’s (2005) findings imply that people infer from a 
successful referential communication the agreement about the impression unless 
there is evidence to suggest otherwise (we will return to this point later). Underly-
ing this process is the sender’s epistemic motivation to verify his or her knowledge 
intersubjectively by establishing shared reality (Echterhoff, Higgins, Kopietz, & 
Groll, 2008). If the receiver’s acceptance of the sender’s presentation is elaborate, 
its effect on the sender is likely to be greater than when the receiver accepts it with 
a minimal acknowledgment. This is because more elaborate grounding would give 
stronger evidence of intersubjective verification, and help the sender gain greater 
confidence in the establishment of a shared reality with the receiver. 
We contend that when the sender’s impressions about a social category are more 
extensively grounded and intersubjectively validated, the more essentialized the 
sender’s perceptions of the social category may become. Essentialism is a naive 
ontological belief that there exists an underlying hidden reality, or an immutable 
essence, beneath the surface appearance of category exemplars (e.g., Gelman, 2004; 
Medin & Ortony, 1989). In line with Medin and Ortony’s thinking, we suggest 
that people have a cognitive schema about a category, which we call the essence-
appearance schema. In this schema, appearances are observable characteristics 
of the exemplars of a category; an essence is that which causes, generates, and 
gives rise to the appearances. When this schema is used to understand a category, 
the category is essentialized. An essence is usually unobservable, and therefore 
people often do not know what it is. It is best regarded as a “placeholder” (Medin 
& Ortony, 1989). People only have to assume that there exists something which 
causes the appearances. Critically, the essence must be immutable. If a category 
can be changed by human activities, it is an artifact, and it does not have a reality 
independent of human action. Once a category is essentialized, and its essence is 
regarded as unchangeable, human efforts cannot do anything about it, and it lies 
in the realm that cannot be touched by human intervention. 
The present hypothesis--communication promotes essentialism--has important 
boundary conditions. First of all, the sender should have some ambiguous infor-
mation about a social category, but the receiver should have no information about 
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the social category. Second, the sender should attribute sufficient epistemic cred-
ibility to the receiver in order for the latter to be treated as a partner for intersub-
jective verification. When the sender has an epistemic authority about ambigu-
ous information and the receiver is sufficiently credible, the sender would feel an 
epistemic need to verify his or her impression intersubjectively, assume that the 
receiver’s understanding implies his or her endorsement and verification, and 
trust the receiver’s endorsement as sufficient evidence for the veridicality of the 
grounded information. Thus, excluded from the scope of the present hypothesis 
are the conditions in which (1) the sender’s information is unambiguous, or (2) 
both the sender and receiver have some information about a social category. In (1), 
the sender would feel no need for intersubjective verification, and therefore it falls 
outside the scope of shared reality theory. In (2), the grounding of impressions is 
unlikely to be sufficient because the receiver is more likely to question the sender’s 
impression or to express a disagreement, thus failing to establish a shared reality. 
In what follows, we elaborate on the present hypothesis by considering the mea-
surement of essentialism and reviewing the existing literature on communication 
and group perception.
Measuring Essentialism
We use the following two aspects as indices of essentialization of a social category: 
(1) attribution of a trait disposition to the social category, and (2) belief that this 
disposition is unalterable or immutable. Theoretical justification for this decision 
is presented below.
Dispositional Attribution. When people apply the essence-appearance schema to 
a social category, they may attribute a disposition to the social group. Indeed, as 
Yzerbyt, Rogier, and Fiske (1998) showed, when a collection of individuals is seen 
to belong to a real social category (a university), people attributed dispositions 
more strongly to the target group than when they were seen to be a mere aggregate 
of individuals. Note that a stronger dispositional attribution can be measured as 
an extreme rating of a social category on a trait dimension, an oft-used measure 
of social stereotypes. Park and Judd (1990) showed that those who attribute a trait 
disposition strongly to a group tend to see the disposition to be widely shared 
within the group, and this perceived prevalence of the disposition is highly related 
to perceived consistency of group behavior (Kashima et al., 2005). If a member of 
a group is observed to have behaved in a certain way, another member is likely to 
behave in a similar manner. Essentialism in this sense may be understood as an 
aspect of perceived entitativity (Campbell, 1958), the perceived “degree of having 
the nature of an entity or having real existence” (p. 17), as some have argued (e.g., 
Ip, Chiu, & Wan, 2006; Kashima et al., 2005; see Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004, 
for a variety of views). One strand of research has used this concept to measure 
(e.g., Brewer, Weber, & Carini, 1995) and to manipulate (e.g., Dasgupta, Banaji, & 
Abelson, 1999) perceived entitativity. Perceived consistency also mediates group 
impression formation (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).
Immutability Belief. The second aspect of essentialism--belief that the underlying 
essence of a social category is believed to be immutable--is particularly important. 
We believe that one psychological symptom of some socially constructed object 
to be treated as an aspect of social reality is that the object is believed to be un-
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alterable by human intervention; that is, people believe that the object cannot be 
changed. Dweck’s (1999) notion of entity theory aptly captures this aspect of es-
sentialism. According to Dweck and her colleagues (1999; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 
1995), there are two general implicit theories about human nature. Entity theory 
holds that various attributes of a person are fixed and cannot be changed by effort, 
whereas incremental theory holds that attributes are malleable and can be altered 
by self-development and cultivation. Bastian and Haslam (2006) showed that en-
tity theory was one of the central aspects of the broader syndrome of essentialism. 
Linking the immutability aspect of essentialism to its dispositionism aspect, Chiu, 
Hong, and Dweck (1999) showed that, from an observation of an individual tar-
get’s behavior, entity theorists are more likely than incremental theorists to infer 
the target’s underlying disposition, to generalize the observation to another con-
text, and to make an extreme evaluation of the target. Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck 
(1998) extended this work to social categories, showing that those who believe that 
a social category has an unchangeable essence tend to hold stronger stereotypes. 
It is often said that an essentialized social category is not only immutable, but 
should also be biologically based. However, we contend that not all essences of es-
sentialized social categories may be biological. Take a social category of Muslims 
for example. This category may be essentialized if people regard its essence--belief 
in Allah and way of living according to the Koran--to be an unchangeable essence 
of their being, and it gives rise to its observable behavioral characteristics. Belief in 
Allah does not have to be biologically based; all that is required in our definition of 
essentialism is that people believe it is unchangeable. In this sense, our definition 
entails the biologically based essentialism as its subset, but is broader than the 
latter because it can be used to characterize social categories that are thought to 
possess a nongenetic essence.
Communicating About a Social Category
We hypothesized that when a social category is well grounded and a shared real-
ity is established, the sender’s perceptions of the social category are essentialized, 
understood in terms of both (1) stronger dispositional attribution, and (2) greater 
perceived immutability of the disposition. Whereas no evidence exists for (2), the 
existing literature is consistent with (1). In Zajonc’s (1960) cognitive tuning work, 
those who anticipated to communicate about a target person were shown to con-
struct a more coherent impression about the target than those who expected to 
receive a communication. Subsequent research showed that senders were more 
likely than receivers to make trait inferences spontaneously (e.g., Hoffmann, Mis-
chel, & Baer, 1984) and make stronger dispositional attributions to the target per-
son (e.g., Harvey, Harkins, & Kagehiro, 1976; for a review, see Guerin & Innes, 
1989). In this article, we will call polarization the tendency to make more extreme 
dispositional judgments about a target when strong dispositional attributions are 
made on a bipolar dimension anchored by two contrasted traits (e.g., kind vs. un-
kind). In a related vein, Higgins and Rholes (1978) gave their participants ambiva-
lent information about a target individual, and told them to communicate about 
the target to an audience whose attitude toward the target was either positive or 
negative, so that the audience can identify the target. The message showed an 
audience tuning: the participants described the target positively (negatively) for 
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the audience who liked (disliked) the target, evaluated the target accordingly on 
personality trait terms (i.e., stronger dispositional attribution), and recalled the 
information congruent with the evaluation. Moreover, impressions became even 
stronger after a delay. This has been called a “saying is believing (SIB)” effect. In 
contrast, when participants did not communicate about the target, they did not 
show any SIB effect. Thus, communications polarized impression judgments rela-
tive to the no communication condition.
Echterhoff et al.’s (2005, 2008) findings suggest that the SIB effect is largely due 
to the communicators’ expectation and belief that they successfully grounded 
their shared reality of the target with the audience. Using recall, the SIB effect was 
obtained when the communicator was led to believe that the audience was able to 
understand who the target was or that the audience was an ingroup member, who 
he or she thought can be trusted as a source of valid information. Thus, beliefs or 
expectations of successful grounding played an important role in the emergence 
of a SIB. Zajonc’s (1960) Experiment 2 corroborates this point: he found a stronger 
cognitive tuning effect when the message senders believed that their audience was 
likely to agree with them than when they thought the audience would disagree 
with their message. Taken together, the literature suggests that when the message 
senders expected their audience would corroborate their impression of a target 
individual, the senders’ impressions were more coherent and polarized.
Extending the communication effects on person perceptions to group percep-
tions, Thompson, Judd, and Park (2000) reported that when two people with first-
hand information about a group (senders) and two others who had no information 
(receivers) discussed about the target group that was described by a mixture of 
stereotypical and counter-stereotypical information, both the senders’ and receiv-
ers’ impressions about the group were more polarized than when they had no 
discussion. Within the “saying is believing” experimental paradigm, Haussmann, 
Levine, and Higgins (2008) also showed that the SIB effect was obtained for a 
group target as well. Brauer, Judd, and Jacquelin’s (2001) findings suggest that 
this polarization effect is likely due to the grounding of the stereotypical informa-
tion, and its intersubjective validation. When everyone in a three-person discus-
sion group had more stereotypical than counter-stereotypical information, their 
impressions after the discussion were more polarized than when one of the three 
members had more counter-stereotypical than stereotypical information (the other 
two had more stereotypical than counter-stereotypical information). Apparently, 
the dissenting voice of the person who had more counter-stereotypical informa-
tion disrupted the grounding of the stereotypical information, thus preventing the 
impressions from polarizing.
Present Research
We tested the hypotheses that communication about a group strengthens the send-
er’s attribution of trait-like dispositions to the group, and immutability percep-
tions of the group. In Study 1, we examined the effect of written communication to 
ingroup members about impressions about a new outgroup. Participants received 
behavioral information about members of a social category (i.e., an unnamed resi-
dential college at the university), and asked to communicate or to memorize them. 
In the communication condition, they wrote letters describing the group. Group 
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impressions in the communication and memory conditions were compared. Us-
ing similar stimuli, Study 2 examined the effect of grounding activities generated 
by the receiver on the sender’s group impressions by manipulating the receiver’s 
responses. In Study 3, we allowed a sender and a receiver to interact freely face-to-
face, and examined the effects of naturally occurring grounding activities on the 
sender’s and receiver’s group impressions.
STudy 1
This study examined the effect of senders’ communication on their tendency to es-
sentialize. Participants were given mildly positive or negative information about 
the target group, and told to communicate about it to their friends and relatives, 
arguably the people with whom they would expect to be able to ground their 
shared reality. The memory condition served as a control condition. Participants 
were then asked to make attributions of trait dispositions and judgments of immu-
tability of the dispositions. It was hypothesized that the expectation of successfully 
grounding information about a novel group would be sufficient to essentialize the 
communicator’s group impression. Attributions of dispositions that correspond 
to the stimulus information would be stronger (and therefore trait attributions be 
more polarized) and the dispositions would be more strongly believed to be im-
mutable in the communication condition than in the memory condition.
METHod
Participants and Design
Ninety-two undergraduate students (30 men, 62 women) at a university in Mel-
bourne, Australia, were recruited for participation in this experiment. They were 
paid AUD5 for one hour. The experiment was two-way factorial. One factor was 
the instructions, communication versus memory. The other factor was the stimu-
lus condition. Friendly behaviors were more prevalent in one condition, and hos-
tile behaviors were more prevalent in the other condition (friendly vs hostile).
Stimuli
The stimuli were 20 behavioral episodes purportedly performed by individual 
members of a group on campus. The behaviors were selected from a pool of items 
pretested on 100 participants to determine the extent to which they are hostile 
or friendly on a 9-point scale (1 = hostile, 9 = friendly). The mean ratings were 
used as estimates of the scale values of those items. The number of episodes for 
the friendly condition were 2 (3-4, namely, scale values between 3 and 4), 4 (4-5), 
8 (5-6), 4 (6-7), and 2 (7-8). The behaviors for the hostile condition were 2 (2-3), 4 
(3-4), 8 (4-5), 4 (5-6), and 2 (6-7). Therefore these items roughly formed a symmetric 
distribution on the bipolar dimension with the mean slightly on the friendly side 
in the friendly condition, and vice versa.
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Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were told that the purpose of the experiment was to 
examine the process by which people deal with information about other people’s 
behaviors. Half of the participants were told that their task is to memorize the 
information presented about a group of people (memory condition), and the other 
half was told to read the information so that they can communicate what they 
have learned about the group (communication condition). The stimuli were then 
presented in a booklet with one behavioral episode printed on each page. The par-
ticipants were given 8 seconds to read each page.
In the communication condition, the participants were asked to write three short 
notes about the group to three different people: an older relative, a high school 
friend, and a university friend. They were given 2 minutes to write each note. In 
the meantime in the memory condition, the participants were given a distracter 
task of drawing the floor plan of their house. Immediately afterwards, the partici-
pants were then given a questionnaire containing dependent variables.
The participants were first asked to report their impressions of the group on six 
trait dimensions (5-point scale: 5 = extremely descriptive, 1 = not at all descrip-
tive). Three traits were consistent with friendliness (friendly, warm, outgoing) and 
the other three were consistent with hostility (hostile, cold, aggressive). The traits 
were presented in a random order. 
Next, two other tasks were presented in random orders. One was a consistency 
judgment in which the participants judged the likelihood that another member of 
the group would have each of the personality traits as in the impression judgment 
task. The other was a percentage estimation task in which the participants estimat-
ed the percentage of the members of the group who would have each personality 
trait. The same traits were used and the response scale varied from 0 to 100.
Finally, the participants responded to three items to measure people’s implicit 
theory of personality (Chiu et al., 1997). Although the original items asked about 
the immutability of people’s disposition in general, the present version was re-
worded to tap the respondent’s perceived immutability of the particular group. 
The items were: “It is unlikely that the core disposition of this group can be altered 
though some things may be modified,” “This group has its basic and ingrained 
dispositions, and you really can’t do much to change them,” and “Some events 
may change superficial things about the group, but the fundamental nature of this 
group is something that cannot be changed much.” The participants used a 5-point 
Likert scale (1 = disagree, 5 = agree).
REsuLTs
Because factor analyses of the friendly and hostile trait attributions formed two 
independent factors the judgments on friendly traits and the judgments on hos-
tile traits were averaged separately. Cronbach’s αs were .78 and .88, for friendli-
ness and hostility attributions. Similarly, percentage estimates and generalizability 
judgments were aggregated to compute perceived consistency measures: friendli-
ness and hostility judgments were averaged separately. Cronbach’s αs were .88 
and .95 for friendly and hostile consistency judgments. The items for immutability 
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belief items were averaged to form an immutability belief index (Cronbach’s α = 
.67). 
To examine the effect of communication, a two-way analysis of variance (ANO-
VA) was conducted on dispositional attributions of the consistent traits (i.e., friend-
liness attributions in the friendly stimulus condition, and vice versa). One factor 
was prevalent behavior (friendly vs. hostile) and the other factor was instruction 
(communication vs. memory). Only the main effect of instruction was significant, 
suggesting that the effect of communication did not depend on the valence of the 
stimuli. The results are summarized in Table 1. Consistent with expectation, com-
municating about the target group polarized the judgments on traits that are con-
sistent with the overall impression of the group. 
Interestingly, a comparable analysis on trait judgments about the nonconsistent 
traits (i.e., friendly traits in the hostile behavior condition, and vice versa) showed 
that the communication did not polarize the attribution of dispositions that are 
not closely related to the stimulus information. There was no significant effect of 
instruction (see Table 1). However, trait attributions were slightly higher in the 
hostile (M = 2.5) than in the friendly condition (M = 2.1), F(1, 88) = 5.38, p < .05, ηp2 
= .06. Presumably, people were more willing to attribute friendly than hostile traits 
even when the overall impression was negative.
Likewise, comparable ANOVAs were conducted for the perceived consistency 
on the consistent and nonconsistent traits. Again, the instruction main effect was 
significant for the consistent traits (Table 1): participants perceived a higher degree 
of consistency among the group members’ behaviors after they had communicated 
about the group than when they had simply recalled their observations. With re-
gard to the nonconsistent traits, only a prevalent behavior main effect was signifi-
cant. Mirroring the trait judgments, perceived consistency among group members 
was greater in the hostile condition (M = 38.7) than in the friendly condition (M = 
19.0), F(1,88) = 35.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .29.
Finally, immutability belief was subjected to an ANOVA. The instruction main 
effect was the only significant effect (Table 1): communicating about the target 
group strengthened the belief that the group disposition is unalterable.
TaBlE 1. Effects of instructions on Trait dispositional attribution and Perceived Consistency on 
Stimulus Consistent and Non-Consistent Traits, and immutability Belief, and Their relevant means in 
the memory and Communication Conditions in Study 1
measurement memory Comm. F(1,88) ηp2
Trait dispositional Attribution
Consistent Traits 3.3 3.8 8.14** .09
other Traits 2.2 2.3 0.34 .00
Perceived Consistency
Consistent Traits 49.5 61.1 6.74* .07
other Traits 28.0 29.8 0.30 .00
Immutability Belief 3.0 3.4 5.28* .06
Note. **p < .01, *p < .05
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dIsCussIon
As expected, communicating about a target group, relative to memorizing about 
it, essentialized the sender’s group impressions by polarizing the attribution of 
trait dispositions that are consistent with the overall impression of the group, and 
strengthening the immutability belief about the group. Overall, communication 
may help essentialize a social category. This is analogous to, but also extends, Ech-
terhoff et al.’s (2005) finding that a message production for an ingroup member 
was sufficient to generate a SIB effect. Echterhoff et al.’s finding was concerned 
about an effect of message production on recall; in this study, we showed that 
message productions for ingroup members were sufficient not only to polarize the 
group impression, but also to strengthen the immutability belief about the group’s 
essence. 
It is interesting to note that perceived consistency also showed a pattern com-
parable to dispositional attribution. The attribution of trait dispositions to a group 
and consistency judgments were so highly correlated (between .64 and .80) that 
they are likely to be measuring the same underlying construct. Indeed, our per-
ceived consistency measure is very similar to one type of perceived homogeneity 
measure used by Park and Judd (1990; percentage estimation task), in which these 
measures and trait attribution measures loaded on the same underlying latent 
variable. We will drop the perceived consistency measure from the next studies. 
Interestingly, the communication did not affect the attribution of trait disposi-
tions that are not consistent with the overall impression of the group. The per-
ceived consistency again showed a comparable pattern. Thus, it is not that com-
munication strengthens any beliefs, but its effects are selective and localized to the 
judgments relevant to the stimulus information. Presumably, when people com-
municate about a target group, they attempt to present a coherent picture about 
it; in so doing, the information that is consistent with the overall impression may 
be emphasized more, but the other information may not be affected. It is note-
worthy that, although the original stimuli were pilot tested in terms of the bipolar 
dimension of friendliness versus hostility, this bipolar dimension may be better 
understood as two related unipolar dimensions. A group that is not friendly is not 
necessarily hostile, but may be simply neutral; a group that is not hostile is not 
always friendly. In order to avoid this complication, different stimuli were used to 
extend the generality of the findings. 
STudy 2
Study 1 showed that a sender’s message production may be sufficient to essen-
tialize the sender’s views about the social category even in the absence of the re-
ceiver’s response. In this second study, we examined the potential effect of the 
receiver’s grounding by systematically manipulating the receiver’s grounding be-
havior. In particular, we trained confederates to interact with senders differently: 
in one condition, the receivers were trained to accept the sender’s message only 
minimally by nodding or uttering a brief sentence (minimal grounding) or more 
extensively by paraphrasing or asking relevant questions (elaborate grounding). 
We also measured grounding activities in this study. Although duration of time 
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that people spent talking about relevant information has been measured in previ-
ous studies on group discussion and stereotype formation, grounding activities 
have not been directly measured.
METHod
Participants and Design
Forty undergraduate students at a university in Melbourne, Australia participated 
in the experiment (17 men, 23 women). They were all native speakers of English or 
had lived in Australia more than 15 years. Each participant was paired with one of 
two female confederates. 
There were two experimental conditions (minimal vs. elaborate grounding) in 
which a female confederate posed as a participant. In both conditions, the con-
federate started the conversation by asking the participant for information about 
the club members. However, in the minimal grounding condition, the confederate 
gave only brief responses (e.g., “OK,” “um-hum,” “right”), nonverbal behaviors 
(e.g., nods and gestures), and asked brief, nonspecific questions to maintain the 
conversational flow where required (e.g., “So can you remember anything else?”). 
In the elaborate grounding condition, the confederate responded with more elabo-
rate responses by paraphrasing the sender’s impressions (e.g., “OK, so the club 
members sound really organized then”), and asked more specific questions (e.g., 
“So do you think they were nice people, or nasty?), in addition to nonverbal be-
haviors. 
Within each grounding condition, either positive or negative behaviors of mem-
bers of an unidentified university club were presented. Thirty-six behaviors were 
selected from a pool of behaviors that had been rated by separate 46 participants 
on kindness and organization (1 = unkind to 9 = kind; 1 = disorganized to 9 = 
organized). The means were used to estimate their scale values. For the positive 
stimulus set, 8 behaviors were selected whose scale values were between 5 and 
6 on both kindness and organization. Then, for each dimension (e.g., kindness), 
we selected 3 (8-7), 5 (7-6), 4 (5-4), and 2 (4-3) behaviors. These latter behaviors’ 
scale values were in the neutral range (i.e., between 4 and 6) on the other dimen-
sion (e.g., organization). Likewise, for the negative stimulus set, 8 behaviors were 
selected whose scale values were between 4 and 5 on both dimensions. Again, for 
each dimension, we selected 3 (2-3), 5 (3-4), 4 (5-6), and 2 (6-7) behaviors. These 
latter behaviors were neutral on the other dimension (between 4 and 6). 
The design was a grounding condition (minimal vs. elaborate) x prevalent be-
havior (positive vs. negative) factorial.
Procedure
Sessions took place in a small interview room equipped with a video camera. Each 
participant was introduced to a confederate as another naive participant, who was 
said to be the participant’s conversation partner. The experimenter then asked the 
confederate to wait outside while the participant completed a task. The participant 
read an instruction sheet informing them that they would be reading some infor-
mation about members of a university club, so that he or she can “communicate 
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what you have learned about the group to your communication partner.” One half 
of the participants read the positive set, whereas the other half read the negative 
set. Each behavior was printed on one card, and they were given 8 seconds to read 
each card. The order of the cards was randomized for each session by shuffling 
them. Once the participant had finished reading the stimuli, the confederate was 
returned to the room. Both the participant and confederate were given a second 
instruction sheet explaining the conversation task. They were told that a conversa-
tion would continue for 3 minutes, and that the receiver was to start the conversa-
tion by asking questions about the target group. The experimenter left the room, 
and returned after 3 minutes. Even if the conversation was continuing, it was ter-
minated at that point. At the conclusion of the conversation, both participant and 
confederate completed the questionnaire rating the target group on four trait di-
mensions (kind, unkind, organized, and disorganized) on a 5-point scale (1 = not 
at all, 5 = very) and in terms of the three immutability belief items (1 = disagree, 5 
= agree). The participant was fully debriefed as to the confederate’s identity at the 
conclusion of the session.
REsuLTs And dIsCussIon
Conversational Data
The videotaped conversations were transcribed. Each conversation was first bro-
ken into conversational units based on grounding activities. In its simplest form, a 
conversational unit consisted of the presentation of some information by one par-
ticipant, and the acceptance by the confederate. In more complex examples, a con-
versational unit might contain two or three presentations and acceptances by the 
participant and confederate to establish mutual understanding of the topic. None-
theless, to the extent that one segment of a conversation was concerned about one 
topic, it was coded as a conversational unit. Two coders undertook this analysis 
independently first, and then they discussed to resolve their disagreements, so 
that the subsequent coding could be conducted further.
Each conversational unit was coded as a whole at three levels of grounding: as-
sumed, minimal, or extended. A conversational unit in which the presentation of 
relevant information was met by neither verbal nor nonverbal responses that in-
dicated acceptance of the information was coded as assumed grounding. The past 
research in group discussions would have coded such instances as the presence of 
relevant information in discussion; following this convention, we regarded this as 
the transmission of some information in the conversation. Minimal grounding was 
indicated by a nonverbal response by a conversant or by a brief verbal response 
that indicated the conversant’s understanding (e.g., “OK,” “Right,” “Uh-hm”). Ex-
tended grounding was indicated by more elaborate and detailed responses (e.g., 
“OK, so they had pretty busy lifestyles then”) or by more specific questions (e.g., 
“Did you get the impression they were nice people?”). Each conversational unit 
contained one or more presentations about relevant information: each presentation 
was coded in terms of whether it implied kind, unkind, organized or disorganized 
impressions. The inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s κ) between two independent cod-
ers was satisfactory for grounding (κ = .74) and for the classification of presenta-
tions (κ = .76). Disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
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Based on the agreed coding, grounding score was computed for each con-
versational unit using the following formula: GL*Abs[N(k)-N(u)+N(o)-N(d)]/
[N(k)+N(u)+N(o)+N(d)], where GL indicates the level of grounding achieved for 
the conversational unit (Assumed Grounding = 1; Minimal Grounding = 2; Elabo-
rate Grounding = 3), N() represents the number of pieces of information, kind = k, 
unkind = u, organized = o, or disorganized = d, and Abs[] indicates the absolute 
value of the number within the square brackets. When there was no relevant infor-
mation in a given conversational unit (i.e., N(k)+N(u)+N(o)+N(d) = 0), this score 
was set at 0. The score was then summed across all conversational units. 
This index is based on the assumption that people would aggregate informa-
tion for each conversational unit, and the manner of aggregation followed the 
weighted averaging model (e.g., Anderson, 1981; Kashima, Woolcock, & Kashima, 
2000) where a positive piece of information was scaled as +1 and a negative piece 
scaled as -1. Because the main dependent variable was extremity of the judgments 
on kindness and organization, its absolute value was multiplied by the ground-
ing level, so that the more elaborate is the type of grounding, the higher is the 
grounding score. We then simply aggregated the scores of conversational units by 
summing them.
Judgment Data
The absolute value of the difference between the rating of kindness and the rating 
of unkindness was computed to index the dispositional attribution of kindness; 
the absolute value of the difference between the rating of organization and that 
of disorganization was used as a measure of dispositional attribution of organiza-
tion. Immutability belief was computed by averaging the three items and the reli-
ability was reasonable (α = .67). 
Preliminary Analyses
The extremity, immutability belief, and grounding measures were compared be-
tween the two confederates. No differences were detected. Confederate was not 
included in further analyses. Second, the effectiveness of the grounding manipula-
tion was checked by subjecting the grounding measure to an ANOVA with preva-
lent behavior (positive vs. negative) and condition (elaborate vs. minimal ground-
ing) as between-subjects factors. As expected, condition had the only significant 
effect, F(1, 36) = 22.88, ηp2 = .389, p < .001. Grounding activities were more elaborate 
in the elaborate grounding condition (M = 4.92) than in the minimal grounding 
condition (M = 2.03).
Dispositional Attribution and Immutability Belief
Dispositional attributions of kindness and organization were analyzed by a mixed-
design ANOVA with prevalent behavior and condition as between-subjects factors 
and dimension (kindness vs. organization) as within-subjects factor. There was a 
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marginally significant condition effect, F(1, 36) = 2.84, ηp2 = .073, p = .10, where the 
mean extremity was somewhat greater in the elaborate grounding condition (M = 
1.04) than in the minimal grounding condition (M = .80). However, this effect was 
qualified by dimension, Wilks’s Λ = .88, F(1, 36) = 5.10, ηp2 = .12, p = .03. The at-
tribution of organization was clearly greater in the elaborate grounding condition 
than in the minimal grounding condition (Melaborate = 1.23, Mminimal = .75); however, 
extremity on kindness did not differ between the conditions (Melaborate = .85, Mminimal 
= .85).
To examine whether grounding mediates the condition x dimension interaction 
effect, an ANCOVA was conducted with the same three factors and grounding as 
a covariate. First of all, as expected, grounding had a significant main effect, F(1, 
35) = 5.25, ηp2 = .131, p = .028. This shows that the mediator has a direct relation-
ship with the criterion. Second, the significant condition x dimension interaction 
in the previous ANOVA became nonsignificant, Wilks’s Λ = .918, F(1, 35) = 3.14, ηp2 
= .082, p = .085, providing some evidence for mediation by measured grounding 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). The main effect of condition was not significant, F(1, 35) = 
.001, ηp2 = .00, p = .971.
To further examine the relationship between grounding and dispositional attri-
bution, we computed the correlations of grounding with average attribution (av-
eraged across kindness and organization), as well as attributions of kindness and 
of organization separately (Table 2). The correlations were generally significant 
except that the correlation involving attribution of kindness was only marginal (p 
= .057).
Immutability belief was analyzed by an ANOVA with stimulus and condition as 
between-subjects factors. The predicted condition effect was not significant, F(1, 
36) = .79, ηp2 = .021, p = .38. The correlation between grounding and immutability 
belief was not significant though in the expected direction (Table 2). 
The manipulated grounding had an expected effect on dispositional attribution 
of organization; however, its effect was only marginal for kindness. Furthermore, 
the nature of the elaborate grounding condition was such that it basically invited 
the sender to make trait dispositional inferences. It is not too surprising that elabo-
rate grounding resulted in a greater polarization. In addition, the manipulated 
grounding failed to produce a statistically significant effect on immutability be-
lief. Although the results were generally encouraging, the contrived nature of the 
staged conversation may have produced weak effects. We examined the ground-
ing in conversations between naive participants in Study 3. 
TaBlE 2. Correlations of grounding with Extremity of Kindness and Organization Judgments  
and immutability Belief in Studies 2 and 3
average Extremity Kindness Organization immutability Belief
study 2
sender .44** .25† .43** .21
study 3
sender .63** .25 .64** .54*
Receiver .53** .45* .38† -.06
Note. **p < .01, *p < .05, †p = .06, one-tailed
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STudy 3
In Study 3, we examined the effects of grounding on essentialism in free face-to-
face conversations involving naive participants. We expected that the more elabo-
rate their grounding activities, the more essentialized their impressions would be. 
However, senders and receivers may respond differently to grounding activities. 
Note that our reasoning that senders would regard receivers’ comprehension (i.e., 
grounding) as indicative of the latter’s tacit agreement does not have to extend 
to receivers. When the sender’s impression is grounded, he or she may feel that 
a shared reality is established, but the receiver may not. In line with this, Brauer, 
Judd, and Gliner’s (1995) findings suggest that grounding may affect the senders 
more than the receivers. In their study, participants had a group discussion about 
attitudinal issues, and the effects of their expressing their own attitudes and hear-
ing others’ opinions were examined on their resultant attitudes. In two studies, 
expression of one’s attitudes had a consistently positive effect on one’s final atti-
tudes; however, hearing others’ opinions had little effect. Although this research is 
concerned with attitudes, and not about dispositional attributions, it suggests that 
senders’ own expressions affected their own attitudes, but not receivers’.
Nevertheless, Thompson et al.’s (2000) Experiment 1 suggests that communi-
cation may affect receivers more than senders. They formed three generations 
of three communicators. In the first generation, three people received firsthand 
behavioral information about a target group (more stereotypical than counter-
stereotypical information) and each wrote three notes to the second generation 
participants, who received all three notes from the first generation and wrote three 
notes to the third generation participants. Written communications were sent from 
one generation to the next, but there was no interaction. They found that the at-
tribution of stereotypical traits became more extreme from the first to the second 
generation though it did not change from the second to the third generation. It is 
unknown whether the first generation senders’ impressions were more polarized 
due to communication because there was no control; however, communication 
seems to have affected the receivers’ impressions more than the senders’ in this 
study. 
Nonetheless, neither Brauer et al.’s (1995) nor Thompson et al.’s (2000) study 
examined communication processes as joint activities between a sender and a 
receiver. Brauer et al. did not examine explicitly how people’s expressions were 
grounded by their audiences; Thompson et al.’s Experiment 1 was a one-way com-
munication from one generation to the next without feedback from the latter to 
the former. Thus, the present study examined how grounding as joint activities 
promotes essentialism in senders and receivers. 
METHod
Participants and Design
Thirty-six undergraduate students (3 men, 33 women) at a university in Mel-
bourne took part in the study. They were either native speakers of English or had 
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lived in Australia more than 15 years. Two participants were recruited at a time to 
form a pair. It was ensured that they had no contact prior to the experiment. One 
in each pair was randomly assigned the role of a sender, who read the information 
about a group of people; the other took the role of a receiver, who was to form an 
impression of the group on the basis of the information communicated to him or 
her through conversation with the sender. Participants were given either positive 
or negative behaviors as in Study 2. 
The design was a role (sender vs. receiver) x prevalent behavior (positive vs. 
negative) factorial with the former as a repeated measures factor.
Procedure 
A male experimenter greeted two unacquainted participants when they arrived. 
He described the experiment as examining how people communicate about a 
group to another person who has no knowledge about the group. Participants 
were randomly assigned to the roles of sender and receiver. The receiver was then 
instructed to start and lead the conversation by asking questions about the group 
and generally to keep the conversation active. The sender and the receiver were 
then taken to separate rooms adjacent to the original room. The experimenter gave 
the sender a list of behaviors purportedly performed by the members of the target 
group. The list contained the 36 behaviors used in Study 2 in a random order, and 
the sender was given 5 minutes to read through it and to form impressions about 
the group, so that he or she could “communicate what you have learned about 
the group to your communication partner.” While the sender read the stimuli, 
the receiver performed an unrelated task. When the time was up, the sender and 
receiver were then ushered back to the original room, where they were told to 
start their conversation. A video camera was visible from the participants, they 
were told that a conversation would continue for 5 minutes, the instructions were 
repeated for the receiver to start the conversation by asking questions about the 
target group, and the experimenter left the room. 
After 5 minutes, the experimenter returned to the room, stopped the camera, 
and handed out a questionnaire in which participants rated the target group on 
four trait dimensions (kind, unkind, organized, and disorganized) on a 5-point 
scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very). Participants also responded to the three immutability 
belief items (1 = disagree, 5 = agree).
REsuLTs
Conversational Data
The videotaped conversations were transcribed. The same coding procedure was 
followed as in Study 2. The inter-rater reliability was acceptable for grounding (κ = 
.75) as well as for the classification of the statements (κ = .78). Disagreements were re-
solved by discussion. Although we coded for the extent to which receivers expressed 
agreement or disagreement with the senders’ presentations, there was no instance 
of disagreement; therefore, this was not included in the further analysis. Given the 
nature of the task--senders had all the information and receivers had none--this is 
expected. Based on the coding, grounding index was computed as in Study 2. 
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Judgment Data
Again, the absolute value of the difference between the rating of kindness and 
the rating of unkindness was computed to index the judgment extremity on the 
kindness dimension; the absolute value of the difference between the rating of 
organization and that of disorganization was used as the judgment extremity on 
organization. The extremity score served as the measure of the strength of disposi-
tional attribution. Immutability belief was computed by averaging the three items. 
Nonetheless, the reliability was relatively low (α = .57), thus requiring a cautious 
interpretation. There was no significant difference between the senders and re-
ceivers on any of the scores, t < .60, ns. Their group impressions were analyzed 
separately.
Sender. An analysis of covariance was conducted on the extremity score with 
prevalent behavior (positive vs. negative) as a between-subjects factor and dimen-
sion (kindness vs. organization) as repeated measures, and grounding as a covari-
ate. As expected, the main effect of grounding was significant, F(1, 15) = 9.58, ηp2 
= .39, p = .007. There was also a significant interaction of stimulus and dimension, 
Wilks’s Λ = .73, F(1, 15) = 5.68, ηp2 = .28, p = .031. The estimated means showed 
that judgment extremity was greater on organization than on kindness when the 
overall stimulus was negative (Means: Kind = .54; Organized = 1.18); however, 
there was no difference between the two for the positive set (Means: Kind = .87; 
Organized = .86).
Because there was no dimension x grounding interaction, Wilks’s Λ = .73, F(1, 
15) = 2.28, ηp2 = .13, p = .15, we computed the average of the extremity scores and 
correlated it with grounding. We computed the correlations of grounding with 
extremity scores on kindness and organization separately as well because we only 
found a marginal effect on kindness in Study 2. The results are reported in Table 
2. All correlations were in the expected direction and mostly significant; however, 
the correlation between grounding and kindness was not significant.
An ANCOVA was also conducted on sender’s immutability belief with stimulus 
type as a between-subjects factor and grounding as a covariate. Only the main ef-
fect of grounding was significant, F(1, 14) = 5.33, ηp2 = .28, p = .037. 
Receiver. Extremity scores on kindness and organization were subjected to an 
analysis of covariance with prevalent behavior (positive vs. negative) as a between-
subjects factor, dimension as within-subjects factor, and grounding as a covariate. 
Only the main effect of grounding was significant, F(1, 15) = 5.14, p = .039, ηp2 = .26. 
Immutability belief was analyzed with an ANCOVA with prevalent behavior as a 
between-subjects factor and grounding as a covariate. However, none of the effects 
was significant. Again, comparable correlations were computed (Table 2). All cor-
relations were statistically significant except that receiver immutability belief did 
not correlate with grounding.
dIsCussIon
Study 3 showed the relationship between grounding activities and essentialism. 
The receivers’ more elaborate acceptance of the senders’ communication encour-
aged the senders to essentialize the target group, namely, to make stronger disposi-
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tional attributions and to hold stronger beliefs that the dispositions are immutable. 
Therefore, the senders whose communication was elaborately grounded have felt 
that the target group possessed an immutable essence. It is interesting to note that 
for senders, the relationship between grounding and extremity was significant for 
organization, but not for kindness. This parallels the results in Study 2, where the 
effect of grounding was clearly significant for organization, but only marginal for 
kindness. It is difficult to interpret this difference, but may require further research 
into the difference between the moral dimension related to warmth and coldness 
(such as kindness) and the ability dimension related to competence and incompe-
tence (such as organization) in future research. By contrast, for receivers, although 
the more elaborate grounding appears to polarize the receivers’ group impressions 
on both kindness and organization, this did not translate to a stronger belief in the 
immutability of the group disposition. This suggests that grounding activities do 
not necessarily result in the receivers’ shared reality. It is understandable that the 
receivers did not feel that their comprehension of the senders’ impressions meant 
their tacit agreement. 
The results were generally in line with Brauer et al.’s (1995) findings about 
group discussion and attitudes. Given the nature of the current task, all ground-
ing activities were based on the senders’ expressed opinions about the target: the 
more the senders expressed their views about the target group, the more ground-
ing activities have occurred, and the greater was the polarization. However, our 
results went beyond their findings in that not only were group dispositions attrib-
uted more strongly, but the attributed dispositions were more strongly believed 
to be immutable. Nonetheless, the effects of grounding on the receivers’ group 
dispositional attributions somewhat diverged from Brauer et al.’s results; in their 
study, hearing others’ opinions did not affect receivers’ attitudes. Still, our results 
are understandable given the nature of the task. Receivers had only the senders’ 
communications in making judgments about the target group: the more informa-
tion was grounded about the target group, the stronger were the receivers’ dispo-
sitional attributions. This may have simply reflected the effect of the amount of 
information available to the receivers. 
This study yielded results somewhat different from Thompson et al.’s Experi-
ment 1, where they found that receivers’ impressions were more polarized than 
senders’. However, this may be because of the difference in the communication 
task. Thompson et al.’s receivers received three independent communications from 
three senders. The fact that multiple senders independently gave similar commu-
nications about the target group would surely increase the intersubjective validity 
of the target impression, just as in Asch’s (1956) classical research where the level 
of conformity increased when the pressure came from three people rather than 
only two. In the present study, there was only one information source. 
gENEral diSCuSSiON
The results generally supported the hypothesis that communication promotes es-
sentialism through grounding. We argued that two measures would reflect essen-
tialism as a psychological symptom of the feeling that a social category is socially 
real, namely, attributions of dispositions to a social category and beliefs in their 
immutability. In Study 1, communicators essentialized more than those who sim-
324 KaShima ET al.
ply memorized information. In Study 2, we manipulated the grounding activities. 
Extensive grounding strengthened the senders’ attribution of one of the disposi-
tions (i.e., organization), but not the other. When measured grounding was used 
as a predictor, it was shown to correlate with the senders’ overall dispositional 
attribution, but it did not significantly correlate with immutability belief. Instead 
of the contrived conversations, in Study 3, naive participants acted as senders and 
receivers. They showed stronger attributions of dispositions to the social category 
when they engaged in more extensive grounding; however, grounding was associ-
ated with the senders’ immutability beliefs only, and not with the receivers’.
The overall weight of evidence appears to support the hypothesis; however, we 
decided to conduct a simple meta-analysis to estimate the effect sizes of the re-
lationships of grounding with dispositional attribution and immutability belief. 
The F-statistic (and the relevant degree of freedom) computed within the ANOVA 
or ANCOVA was used to estimate a z-valued effect size for each study, and the 
overall effect size was then estimated by weighting each effect size by the sample 
size (Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991). We used META (Kenny, 2003) to compute the 
relevant statistics (Table 3). The effect sizes were reasonably homogeneous (χ2 sta-
tistics were not significant). The overall effect size was highly significant for both 
dispositional attribution and immutability belief. When converted to correlations, 
the relation between grounding and dispositional attribution was approximately 
.31, and the relation between grounding and immutability belief was .21. We also 
computed the effect sizes based on the measured grounding, rather than manipu-
lated grounding; the overall effect sizes were again significant for dispositional 
attribution and immutability belief. The fail-safe N, which indicates the number 
of nil results required to make the overall effect nonsignificant, suggests that the 
results were reasonably robust. 
It is perhaps not too surprising that elaborate grounding strengthens the attri-
bution of underlying dispositions to a social category. Provided that there is al-
ready a spontaneous cognitive tendency to make dispositional inferences while 
just planning to communicate (Hoffmann et al., 1984), elaborate grounding could 
facilitate their cognitive rehearsal, elaboration, and bolstering along the relevant 
trait dimension, and this can produce a moderate level of relationship between 
grounding and dispositional attribution. However, it is intriguing to consider the 
following possibility. It may be because communicators are usually asked to elabo-
rate along dispositional trait dimensions in typical conversations about individu-
TaBlE 3. meta-analysis of the Effect Sizes (z) in Studies 1 Through 3
Study N Extremity immutability Belief
study 1 92 2.78 2.26
study 2 40 1.64 (2.20) 0.88 (1.75)
study 3 18 2.68 2.06
overall z 3.63** (3.85***) 2.75* (3.09*)
χ2 2.81 (2.55) 1.63 (1.08)
p for χ2 .25 (.28) .44 (.58)
fail-safe N 8 (9) 3 (5)
Note. Within parentheses are the relevant numerical values based on measured (rather than manipulated) grounding in 
study 2; ***p < .0001; **p < .001; *p < .01.
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als and groups that they tend to make spontaneous trait inferences when they are 
preparing to communicate about them. In other words, it may be the linguistic 
practice of talking about dispositional trait implications that is responsible for the 
grounding-polarization relationship.
Nonetheless, it is less obvious how cognitively elaborating on an inferred dis-
position alone can turn it into an immutable essence. Elaboration would make 
the inferred disposition more extreme, but why should elaboration make it im-
mutable? We contend that it is the activation of the essence-appearance schema 
due to its intersubjective verification that turns the inferred disposition into an 
immutable essence. Thus, our findings add to the growing literature on shared re-
ality by showing that elaborate grounding strengthens immutability beliefs about 
the attributed dispositions. This aspect of the findings suggests that interpersonal 
communication, particularly, grounding processes, plays a significant role in the 
construction of a shared social reality. As we noted earlier, the immutability aspect 
of essentialism implies that the immutable essence is beyond human intervention 
and manipulation; it may be believed to be something entrenched in one’s shared 
reality that it cannot be altered. Although this latter effect is only weak, if recurrent 
and cumulated over time, it may play an important role.
Our theoretical reasoning and empirical data suggest that some conditions need 
to be met for grounding to result in essentializing. First, senders have ambiguous 
information, but receivers have no information, about a social category. Second, 
the receivers should have sufficient epistemic credibility for the senders to be able 
to act as a partner for social verification. Echterhoff et al.’s (2005) work suggests 
that the sender and receiver’s shared group membership satisfies this condition. 
It is the ambiguity of the information that motivates the senders to seek intersub-
jective verification about the social category, and it is the epistemic authority of 
the senders that prevent receivers from voicing disagreement. The senders take 
the absence of an explicit dissent as a tacit agreement, and this result in their as-
sumption that there is a shared reality because the receiver is seen by the sender to 
have sufficient epistemic credibility. However, the grounding-essentializing pro-
cess does not apply to receivers; the fact that they do not express disagreements 
does not mean that they agree, and they presumably do not activate the essence-
appearance schema. 
This implies that when both communicators already have some information by 
observing members of a social category, mere grounding is unlikely to be sufficient 
for the essentialization of the social category. In this instance, the sender and the 
receiver are equal in their epistemic authority--unless one has a special expertise 
or other status characteristic--and neither may be willing to take the absence of an 
explicit disagreement as sufficient evidence for intersubjective verification. Here, 
an explicit agreement about each other’s perceptions, beliefs, and feelings may be 
required to establish the shared reality of a social category, and to essentialize it. 
Second, the grounding-essentializing process applies only to social categories 
because the essence-appearance schema is less likely to be applied to other types 
of social groups based on shared goals and tasks (e.g., juries, committees, boards 
of directors). When group members’ behaviors are used as a basis for inferring 
their shared goals (Ip et al., 2006), these goals are less likely to be seen as immu-
table because goals are humanly constructed psychological entities. This is not to 
say that goal-based groups can never be essentialized--witness essentialization of 
terrorist groups for instance--but they are less likely to be.
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All in all, the present research showed that there exists a circumstance in which 
interpersonal grounding processes, and resultant establishment of shared reality, 
play a significant role for the communicative construction of the social reality of 
a social category. It remains to be seen how far and how strong this phenomenon 
may extend in our everyday life. 
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